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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Dealing with a “17 Stone Germany”: 
British Foreign Policy 





From the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 onwards, Great Britain was much 
more diplomatically engaged in Danubian Europe than is usually assumed. 
The transformed political map of this part of Europe, drawn as a result of the 
demise of the Habsburg Empire and the establishment of successor states, 
abounded with trouble spots emerging from ethnic divides and frontier dis-
putes which were never settled in interwar period. Britain was not concerned 
with the details of territorial arrangement in the region, but it was interested 
in maintaining peace and stability that would ensure no regional conflict 
would spill over to the rest of the continent. This would allow Britain to fa-
cilitate trade and economic exchange in Europe and the wider world and, in 
particular, to focus on the affairs of the British Empire.1 With Germany’s and 
the Soviet Union’s exclusion from the affairs of Danubian Europe after the 
war, it was France and Italy that vied for predominance, just as Austria-
Hungary and Imperial Russia had done prior to 1914.2 The Foreign Office 
continuously provided a counsel of moderation with a view to appeasing 
local conflicts between revisionist Hungary and the Little En-
tente―consisting of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania―and between 
revisionist Bulgaria and other Balkan states. The British were, however, 
weary of assuming any commitments in an area not considered to have been 
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of vital strategic importance for them and thus often created the impression 
that they stood completely aloof from Danubian matters. A study of British 
policy towards the Danubian states in the 1930s has aptly labelled such a 
stance and the lack of any decisive line of action “passive pragmatism.”3  
This study will provide a short overview of the key issues with which the 
Foreign Office dealt with in Danubian Europe and then focus on its handling 
of the developing crisis from 1936 onwards that ended in the Second World 
War. It will look into the attitudes of Foreign Office officials and their often-
differing views of the challenge posed by Germany’s expansionist aims in the 
region and the appropriate policy for Britain to pursue. It will also examine 
the impact of policy recommendations formulated in the Foreign Office on 
the highest level of decision-making in the Conservative-dominated Cabinet 
under Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain. One of the major themes 
of this study concerns the internal dynamics of the Foreign Office and Cabi-
net which ultimately shaped the British response to Germany’s penetration of 
Danubian Europe and the consequences that followed.   
The rise of Hitler to power in Germany in 1933 opened a new era in in-
ternational relations. This was first evident in the violent assault on the 
independence of Austria―the Nazi putsch in July 1934 claimed the life of 
the Austrian Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss. British commitment in Danu-
bian Europe was out of the question due to unfavorable public opinion and 
the attitude of Cabinet. Furthermore, without prospect of tangible eco-
nomic assistance to Vienna on account of the unwillingness of economic 
departments to abrogate the most-favored-nation rights, there was little, if 
anything, that could be done to help preserve Austrian independence. Italy 
and France were afraid of German subjugation of Austria for their own 
security reasons. Italy was apprehensive of the Nazi drive towards its own 
German-inhabited province of Alto Adige (Tyrol), taken from Austria after 
World War I, and possible aspirations on the Adriatic coast. France feared 
anything that could strengthen Germany and threaten the peace settlement 
of which it was the main beneficiary and guardian. The three powers even-
tually issued a joint declaration on February 17, 1934, which upheld Aus-
tria’s independence and integrity in accordance with the peace treaties. The 
Anglo-French policy of co-operating with the Italians, despite all the diffi-
culties caused by Mussolini’s ambivalent position―he tried at the same 
time to cultivate a special relationship with Hitler based on their ideological 
affinity―reached its peak at the Stresa Conference in April 1935 convened 
for a show of unity in the face of German rearmament.4  
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The Foreign Office was divided in their view of the immediate Austrian 
problem and its consequences. Edward Carr, a first secretary in the Southern 
Department, produced a memorandum which argued that Austria could not 
maintain her independence and, moreover, that German domination over 
that country was preferable than Italian as it offered better prospects for eco-
nomic and political stability. Owen O’Malley, the head of the Southern De-
partment, and Reginald Leeper, the head of the Press Department, endorsed 
his views. On the other side, Ralph Wigram, the head of the Central De-
partment, Orme Sargent, an assistant under-secretary, and Robert Vansittart, 
the permanent under-secretary, resolutely opposed Carr’s arguments. Vansit-
tart had long been advocating support for Austria with a view to the long-
term consequences of Anschluss: he believed that the destruction of the small 
Alpine republic would just mark the beginning of successive and acquisitive 
German actions in Europe which would pose ever greater menace for Brit-
ain. In one of his typical metaphors, Vansittart warned:  
 
I remain one of those simple persons who prefer a 13 stone Germany to 15 stone 
Germany. The programme put before me here is one of an eventual 17 stone 
Germany―for she would put on another stone or two later on. . . . She is, believe 
me, less dangerous at 13 stone―a very nice weight for anyone, & one which ad-
mits of the existence of some other 12 st[one] people. When she ceases to be in-
flamed and sobers down, I shall less dislike the 15 st[one] programme―though I 
shall never take kindly to a 17 stone programme for a potential cannibal. . . . To 
put the matter the other way around is a most dangerous gamble. . . . I do not 
think you will break her [German] appetite by feeding her on men.5  
 
This debate set the tone for many others that would follow: from the 
outset it was assumed that Germany was intent on expanding her economic 
and political might in Europe. Mainly resulting from Vansittart’s efforts, 
the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence which labored between November 1933 and June 1934 identified 
Germany rather than Japan as Britain’s ultimate enemy and lobbied the 
increase in armed forces to support a continental commitment in Europe.6 
Unfortunately, Italian aggression against Abyssinia beginning in October 
1935 dealt a serious blow to Anglo-Italian relations. Unlike the French, the 
British did not condone Italy’s African adventure, but nor did they make 
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Mussolini realize that his aggression would be opposed by means of the 
League of Nations’ sanctions. The Italian attack thus strained Anglo-
French relations and spelled a death knell to both the collective security of 
the League of Nations and the so-called Stresa front. Moreover, it pushed 
the Duce away from the western democracies and into the arms of Hitler.7 
Mussolini was now resigned to the fact that Austria would sooner or later 
fall into German hands and sought for compensations in other directions at 
the expense of London and Paris. In addition, Hitler reoccupied the de-
militarized Rhineland on March 7, 1936, in contravention to both the Ver-
sailles and Locarno Treaty of 1925. The strategic implications of this move 
for smaller Danubian states were obvious: they could hardly expect any 
military assistance from France in case of German aggression.  
Shortly before the German blatant breach of the treaties, Carr and Wil-
liam Strang, head of the Central Department after 1936, contended that 
since Germany must expand somewhere, she should have an “economic” 
preponderance in Austria and the entire Central and South-Eastern 
Europe. Once again, Vansittart warned against handing out South-Eastern 
Europe to Germany and insisted that concessions to that country must be 
part of a general political settlement encompassing “a [German] return to 
Geneva, disarmament and a formal renunciation of any territorial designs 
in Europe, including any covert aims of absorption via disruption in Austria 
and Czechoslovakia.” He was seconded by Lawrence Collier, the head of 
the Northern Department, who pointed out that German economic pene-
tration also implied a political one.8 For the British, it was difficult to deci-
pher what Hitler really wanted; for example, it was considered he would be 
satisfied with cultural, and not territorial, autonomy for the Sudeten Ger-
mans in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, by 1936, the Foreign Office came to 
the conclusion that Britain had to make a choice in her relations with Ger-
many: either make it clear to Hitler that expansion in Central and South-
Eastern Europe was not acceptable, in which case Germany would have to 
be given concessions elsewhere, namely in overseas colonies, or to sit firmly 
on the colonies and consent to German penetration in these regions, pro-
vided it was done peacefully and without abrogating the principles of the 
League of Nations.9  
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The remilitarization of the Rhineland was a catalyst for British policy-
makers. In Sargent’s analysis, the British government was facing a dilemma 
as to whether it should seek a general European agreement which could, if 
Germany refused to cooperate, lead to the conclusion of a defensive alli-
ance between France, Britain, and Belgium or strive for an Anglo-French-
German agreement to stabilize the situation in the west and leave the 
south-east of the continent to its fate. Vansittart instantly made his stance 
clear: “What would a purely Western, and hand-washing settlement be 
worth in the long run?”10 This tortuous question was debated at the Cabi-
net meeting on July 6, 1936, in connection with an eventual conference of 
the Locarno Powers in Brussels and was interlocked with two other key 
issues: the future of the League of Nations and German colonies. The dis-
cussion was informed by two basic assumptions. The first was the consid-
ered opinion of Eric Phipps, Ambassador in Berlin, “that it might be possi-
ble to get Germany to enter into a new Locarno Treaty, but it would be at 
the expense of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.” The second was that 
British defensive preparations were not sufficiently advanced for a potential 
war with Germany at present and that public opinion was anyway averse to 
the possibility. In the circumstances, the Cabinet decided that Britain could 
not uphold its full obligations to the League and had to focus on regional 
security in Western Europe. “Consequently, it was suggested our policy 
ought to be framed on the basis that we could not help Eastern Europe” 
but “we should not announce that we were unwilling or unable to help.” 
When someone asked if constant truckling to Hitler was not having the 
effect of encouraging him in his aggressive policy and thus leading to war, 
the reply was frank and succinct: “at the moment the country had neither 
the means nor the heart to stop him.”11 Ten days later, the Cabinet went 
even further and decided to “confine” discussion with Germany to a new 
Locarno only, a settlement limited to Western Europe.12  
Vansittart was alarmed with such a decision and saw it as ignoring the 
reality of Hitler’s designs on Central and Eastern Europe.13 The Foreign 
Office under his direction spared no effort to influence the Cabinet to re-
consider the far-reaching consequences of its newly-proclaimed policy. 
Sargent and Wigram jointly prepared a memorandum, circulated to the 
Cabinet, in which they argued that Britain should maintain its policy of 
searching for a general settlement rather than one confined to Western 
Europe. The latter course, they claimed, would not provide any assurance 
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of general peace as it would neither cover real danger spots, nor be accept-
able to France. It would also not secure a détente with Germany, as the 
restitution of her colonies would remain as a grievance.14 However, from 
summer 1936 onwards, it became increasingly clear that Vansittart’s policy 
recommendations, which emphasized the need to include Eastern Europe 
in any agreement with Germany, were out of step with the prevailing opin-
ion in the Cabinet. In October, it emerged from Cabinet discussions that 
“an Eastern and Central European settlement” should not be placed in the 
forefront of a conference with the Locarno Powers “since our intention was 
to avoid putting so much prominence on the Eastern settlement as to block 
the way to a settlement in Western Europe.”15 This was exactly the sort of 
diplomatic strategy that Vansittart had disproved of and found inadequate 
for protecting British interests on the continent.  
Along with Austria, Czechoslovakia presented another danger spot that 
could spark a general conflagration. In the latter half of the 1930s, and in 
parallel with the growing strength of Nazi Germany, the German minority 
in Bohemia became restless. The British were concerned that this internal 
trouble might invite the interference of Germany and turn into an interna-
tional crisis which could provoke another European-scale war—given the 
existing defensive treaties between Czechoslovakia and France signed in 
1925, France and the Soviet Union, and, finally, Czechoslovakia and the 
Soviet Union concluded in 1935. The tenor of reports from Joseph Addi-
son, minister in Prague from 1930 to 1936, was notoriously anti-Czech. 
Addison’s cynical and entertaining, but defamatory, reports about internal 
and external affairs of Czechoslovakia earned that country an exceedingly 
bad reputation in the Foreign Office. According to him, Czechoslovakia 
was an artificial and untenable creation in which the Czech minority was 
suppressing all other nationalities, and especially the racially and culturally 
superior Germans.16 Although Addison’s “dislike for the Czechs” and 
“characteristic depreciation of the country” were duly noted, the Foreign 
Office officials still considered his dispatches to be “first-rate.”17 For all 
Addison’s racist slurs and bias, it was only before his departure from the 
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Prague Legation that Vansittart and Anthony Eden, foreign secretary after 
December 1935, expressed their dissatisfaction with his unsolicited sugges-
tions as well as his overall performance.18  
From the 1935 elections onwards, the main representative of the Ger-
man minority in Czechoslovakia was Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP) led by 
Konrad Henlein who became an instrument of Nazi aggressive designs 
against his own country.19 This fundamental fact was not grasped in the 
Foreign Office where the opinion was unanimous that the Sudeten Ger-
mans had some legitimate grievances of which Henlein was a mouthpiece. 
Furthermore, Henlein was perceived as “moderate” and sincere in his 
protestations of loyalty to the Czechoslovak state, under pressure from 
radical elements of his party, whereas the blame for internal tensions was 
ascribed to the intransigence of President Edvard Beneš and the Czecho-
slovak government.20 After having met Henlein in person during his visit 
to London, Vansittart, in particular, was taken in and convinced in his 
views on the wrong-headedness of the authorities in Prague. “France and 
this country can hardly be expected to fight in support of a policy so fool-
ishly stiff and imprudent,” he commented with indignation.21 It was only 
with the benefit of hindsight that Vansittart acknowledged any error, ex-
plaining that he had not been aware that Henlein had been “in Nazi 
pay.”22  
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Beneš’s foreign policy constituted another concern for the Foreign Of-
fice. In relation to the Czechoslovak-Soviet pact, conditional on that be-
tween France and the Soviet Union, the majority of the Foreign Office 
officials, including Foreign Secretary John Simon (1931–35), found that 
the Czechs had embarked on a highly dangerous course by overtly associat-
ing themselves with the Soviets.23 Such assessment was based on Czecho-
slovakia’s heterogeneous ethnic composition and inherent weakness there-
from, which made it a folly for Prague to pursue a forward foreign policy. 
On the other hand, Collier and Vansittart realized that Germany aimed at 
the disruption of Czechoslovakia and thus argued that Beneš had no alter-
native.24 It was rather indicative of the animosity felt in the Foreign Office 
to the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty that German propaganda, cloaked in an 
anti-communist campaign, regarding the alleged military cooperation be-
tween the two countries was taken at face value. In particular, many offi-
cials, such as O’Malley, Bramwell, and Carr, suspected that the Czechoslo-
vak airports were used by Soviet aircraft in anticipation of a showdown with 
Germany.25 The War Office also suspected there was some military under-
standing behind the treaties concluded between the Soviets, French, and 
Czechs “in a form which can with truth be officially denied.”26 This mis-
leading information largely came from the Prague Legation, and it was 
mostly Robert Hadow who was proffering it with persistence and convic-
tion, along with his unduly alarmist warnings about the bolshevization of 
the country in which he served.27 Both the British military and air attaché 
to Czechoslovakia did not believe in the rumors about the Russian air-
planes, but even their considered opinion was not enough to do away with 
the illusions harbored at the Prague Legation and, for that matter, the For-
eign Office.28 Collier was therefore perfectly justified when he proclaimed: 
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“I am not convinced by Mr. Hadow, who is notoriously inclined to see 
everything through anti-Czech spectacles, and, like Sir J. Addison, swallows 
anything from the opponents of Dr. Benes.“29  
Charles Bentinck, the new minister in Prague, reported along the lines 
of his predecessor, though without the latter’s racist prejudices, insisting 
that Czechoslovakia had to improve the lot of the Sudeten Germans and 
reach an agreement with Germany. In 1937, however, the mood of the 
Foreign Office changed, and Bentinck’s suggestions were met with a great 
deal of skepticism. Connor Green noted that “the writer has entirely failed 
to grasp the fact that, since Germany is bent on imposing her will on 
Czechoslovakia, a solution of the Sudetendeutsch problem would be ex-
tremely unlikely to have any effect whatever on German intentions.” Van-
sittart similarly ceased to stress the maltreatment of Sudeten Germans. He 
continued to favor an improvement in their status, but now for tactical 
reasons rather than on merit: it was crucial, Vansittart claimed, to rob the 
Germans of their excuse for meddling in Czechoslovakia’s affairs and buy 
some time in the process.30  
To counter Germany’s predatory intentions in Central Europe, the Brit-
ish still counted on Rome. It was an article of faith in the Foreign Office 
that Italy’s opportunist policy towards Germany was incompatible with 
true Italian interests because German subjugation of Austria and Czecho-
slovakia would bring about immense dangers and ultimately vassalage of 
Italy to the Reich.31 To be sure, there was much in Mussolini’s previous 
conduct that could support such a belief. Italy had concluded the Rome 
Protocols in March 1934 with Austria and Hungary, carving out her own 
economic and political sphere of interest in Central Europe, and that ar-
rangement certainly implied a special commitment to Austrian independ-
ence. This had been convincingly proven four months later at the time of 
Dolfuss’ assassination when Italian divisions had mobilized on the Brenner 
Pass to come to Vienna’s aid if necessary. But as we have seen, the Abys-
sinian affair aggravated Italian relations with Britain and France beyond 
repair, without a realistic prospect of returning to the anti-German Stresa 
front. The Foreign Office did not appreciate this fundamental change and 
stuck to the belief that Italy would have to reorient its policy towards Lon-
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don and Paris. Consequently, O’Malley formulated a common apprecia-
tion of the relations between Rome and Berlin as follows:  
 
As far as the Southern Department is concerned, we have always maintained 
that the danger was slight of real cooperation between Italy and Germany; that 
what was going on was just a flirtation which both parties calculated was likely 
to make us more rather than less acquiescent to their several points of view; that 
it was Italy who was making the running and that the Germans had not altered 
their traditional view of Italy as a thoroughly unreliable and in some respects 
almost contemptible Power.32 
 
This illusion was not shaken even by Mussolini’s famous Milan speech 
of November 1, 1936, in which he declared the formation of the Rome-
Berlin Axis. Facing difficulties with both dictators, the Foreign Office felt, 
despite some reservations on the part of Eden, that it would be beneficial to 
ease tensions with Italy in the Mediterranean with a view to preventing a 
political agreement between Italy and Germany.33 The Cabinet endorsed 
such views and authorized Eden to “adopt a policy of improving relations 
with Italy.”34 Eventually, this line of reasoning and negotiations with Mus-
solini led to the platitudinous Gentlemen’s Agreement of January 2, 1937, 
which neither dispelled mutual suspicions in the Mediterranean nor ar-
rested the Italian drift towards Berlin.  
But central to the formulation of Foreign Office policy towards Danu-
bian Europe was to assess how German ambitions in this region would 
affect Britain and what could be done to prevent a crisis. Strang argued 
that Britain could not risk its own existence in a war over Central Europe 
and he did not believe that France would intervene militarily in that re-
gion. He hoped that British rearmament and continued expression of 
interest in the affairs of Central Europe might deter Germany from vio-
lence. If that proved not to be the case, Strang recommended “a parallel 
policy, the object of which would be to ensure, if possible, that if changes 
take place at all, they would take place in peaceful and orderly condi-
tions.” Eden took a favorable view of Strang’s analysis, although he dif-
ferentiated between the cases of Austria and Czechoslovakia. He thought 
that Britain could do nothing to assist the former country and did not 
believe that Anschluss would considerably change the balance of power. 
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“I am myself doubtful whether Germany would in fact gain so much in 
increased capacity for aggression from the absorption of Austria,” Eden 
professed. On the other hand, he found Czechoslovakia’s position differ-
ent insofar the majority of her population was willing to fight, and France 
was bound to defend her.35 
Contrary to the positions above, Sargent was convinced that satisfying 
German ambitions in Central Europe “would not bring stabilization or 
security to Europe as a whole.” In his view, it made no difference if Ger-
many achieved her goals by force or peacefully as Strang suggested, be-
cause the result would be the same―the strengthening of German and the 
consequent weakening of British position. In the latter case, Britain would 
be an accomplice “in the coercion of a large number of people, who would 
be deprived of their independence.”36 Vansittart insisted that what Ger-
many described as her legitimate claims in Central and South-Eastern 
Europe clouded much more ominous demands than merely economic 
dominance. When Alexander Cadogan responded by enquiring as to the 
exact meaning of German hegemony to which British policy was opposed, 
Vansittart put down on record what he feared with prophetic foresight: “It 
means, to be quite precise, the conquest of Austria & Czechoslovakia & the 
reconquest of Danzig & Memel; followed by the reduction of the other 
states to the condition of satellites―military satellites when required. . . . 
We fought the last war largely to prevent this.”37  
Nevertheless, there was a consensus that concessions would have to be 
given to Germany if there was to be some general settlement. Vansittart 
and Sargent were―unlike most of their contemporaries―willing to grant 
them in colonies at the expense of Britain, rather than in Danubian Europe 
at the expense of other nations. Although both officials did stress the im-
morality of making unsavory bargains and pointed out that confrontation 
with Germany concerned the very survival of democracy and personal lib-
erty,38 there were classical strategic reasons behind their recommendations. 
Vansittart spelled out to Harold Nicolson, a former Foreign Office col-
league, in no uncertain terms his conviction “that a German hegemony in 
Europe means the end of the British Empire”; even if an attempt was made 
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“to buy Germany off for a generation by offering her a free hand against 
the Slav countries,” that would be of no avail. “Once she has established 
herself in an unassailable position she will turn round upon us and we shall 
be too weak to resist her.”39 Vansittart and Sargent had no illusions that 
even a redistribution of colonies would put an end to European troubles, 
but they found that such proposal “would have this advantage over the 
abandonment of Central Europe, that we should be gratifying Germany’s 
pride and ambitions without in the process strengthening her strategically 
or politically.”40 Sargent even proposed to state frankly to the Germans that 
the annexation of Austria would change the balance of power between 
Great Powers and the consequent growth of German strength would be-
come a threat to general peace and British interests.41  
As Vansittart and Sargent were the most senior officials, their views in-
formed Foreign Office policy. It was based on the premise that the precari-
ous peace and stability of Europe hinged on close Anglo-French under-
standing, the execution of a British rearmament program “and a lingering 
doubt in the minds of some Government whether, in fact, Great Britain 
would refrain from armed intervention if trouble arouse.”42 Although Brit-
ain was actually not prepared to use force of arms to prevent German en-
croachment into Eastern Europe, it refrained from proclaiming so publicly. 
For that reason, it was all the more important to employ delicate diplomacy 
which, along with still-considerable prestige, was the only means at Brit-
ain’s disposal to maintain the existing equilibrium. “If we were to intimate 
plainly to Germany that we should not oppose any territorial change that 
would be effected peacefully and by the will of the people, this would tend 
to make it easier for Germany to get what she wanted with the minimum of 
violence as the result of a short, sharp localized war, for our intimation 
would certainly be interpreted as meaning that in fact we should acquiesce 
in the ‘fait accompli’, however achieved.”43 Sargent and Vansittart were 
willing to go further than this with regard to Czechoslovakia. They ad-
vanced the opinion that it was possible to avert disaster in that country if 
the British government said about Czechoslovakia what it had already said 
about Austria―a mere expression of interest in her independence―on the 
grounds that, as Vansittart put it, “a judicious bluff may just turn the scales 
                                  
39 Nigel Nicolson, ed., The Harold Nicolson Diaries, 1907–1964 (London: Phoenix, 
2005), 159; also, minutes by Sargent and Vansittart, June 21, 1937, TNA, C 
5200/3976/18, FO 371/20749.  
40 Minute by Sargent, July 2, 1937, TNA, C 4757/3/18, FO 371/20711.  
41 Minutes by Sargent and Vansittart, June 21, 1937, TNA, C 5200/3976/18, FO 
371/20749.   
42 “Notes on Sir N. Henderson’s Memorandum of May 10, 1937,” October 15, 
1937, TNA, C 5316/270/18, FO 371/20736. 
43 Ibid.  
 Dealing with a “17 Stone Germany” 53 
in the direction of safety.”44 This approach was mindful of the constraints 
of British policy, but it aimed at making the utmost effort to contain Ger-
man danger without risking a war. However, to the British government this 
smacked of assuming responsibility for a settlement possibly entailing hu-
miliating concessions on the part of Czechoslovakia or for the lack of any 
agreement.  
With Neville Chamberlain replacing Stanley Baldwin as prime minister 
in May 1937 the basis of British foreign policy took a significant shift. He 
was determined to make his mark in the conduct of foreign policy and work 
towards finding a modus vivendi with both dictators, thus removing the 
threat to peace and British security. Central to his plans for an Anglo-
German understanding was the notion that Britain had no place in Danu-
bian affairs, and that Germany was entitled to play a preponderant role in 
the region for geographical reasons. It was the visit of the Lord President of 
the Council, Lord Halifax, to Hitler on November 19, 1937, that marked a 
definite departure in British foreign policy away from that previously pur-
sued by the Foreign Office. The prime minister encouraged Halifax’s trip 
despite Foreign Office opposition, presenting it as another opportunity for 
détente with Germany. In fact, Halifax was a mouthpiece of his views. 
Speaking to Hitler about Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig, Halifax 
declared in a blatant disregard for Eden’s brief: “On all these matters we 
were not necessarily concerned to stand for the status quo as today, but we 
were concerned to avoid such treatment of them as would be likely to cause 
trouble. If reasonable settlements could be reached with the free assent and 
goodwill of those primarily concerned we certainly had no desire to 
block.”45 To Hitler who had just two weeks earlier astonished his foreign 
minister and military commanders with his determination to destroy Aus-
tria and Czechoslovakia by force of arms, this statement confirmed what he 
had already come to believe: that Britain would stand aside when he em-
barked on a war.46  
This was the beginning of the eclipse of Foreign Office influence over 
policy-making. Chamberlain and other Cabinet members believed that 
the office was anti-German and thus made it impossible to make a set-
tlement with Berlin and they also doubted the viability of Czechoslova-
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kia.47 In analyzing the Halifax-Hitler conversation and the latter’s agenda 
in Central Europe, Sargent was perfectly aware of the strength of the 
critics of the Foreign Office. He insisted on the importance of putting 
forward new and concrete proposals for Anglo-German understanding to 
pre-empt the suggestions that it was the obstruction of his colleagues and 
him that stood in the way of progress. Therefore, Sargent and Vansittart 
suggested that the Germans be offered colonial concessions and a unilat-
eral declaration of British policy towards them on “an off-chance” that 
this could divert the Reich from expanding in Europe.48 Their proposal 
could not be further from Chamberlain’s position. He pointed out to the 
French prime minister, Camille Chautemps, and foreign minister, Yvon 
Delbos, that Britain would not wage war for the sake of Czechoslovakia. 
Furthermore, along with Eden, he urged French leaders to press the 
Czechs to grant autonomy to Sudeten Germans.49 Since Chamberlain was 
intent on establishing full control over the Foreign Office, he removed 
Vansittart from the position of permanent under-secretary in January 
1938, with an ostensible promotion to the newly-established post of the 
chief diplomatic adviser to the government. The appeasement minded 
Cadogan became a new permanent under-secretary, while Strang had 
already been promoted to the position of the head of Central Department 
after the sudden death of Wigram, Vansittart’s fervent supporter. Eden 
did not oppose the government’s policy over Danubian Europe in the 
wake of Halifax’s visit to Hitler but resigned in February 1938 because of 
Chamberlain’s handling of Italy. With the appointment of Halifax as his 
successor, the Foreign Office was completely under Downing Street’s 
thumb.  
The stage was thus set for British acquiescence in the German annexa-
tion of Austria on 12 March 1938. Although not unexpected, the rapidity 
and forcefulness of Hitler’s action did make a strong impression in Britain. 
The Foreign Office officials were especially alarmed. The previously reluc-
tant Strang expected that Hitler’s success would make him even more will-
ing to take further risks and mused: “This is the case in favour of an imme-
diate declaration on our part of support for France if invaded by Germany 
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as a result of her going to the assistance of Czechoslovakia.”50 However, the 
lesson that Chamberlain drew from the Anschluss was an entirely different 
one. He came to the conclusion that it was impossible to save Czechoslo-
vakia from German aggression and abandoned any thought of giving a 
guarantee to that country.51 Halifax executed Chamberlain’s policy by pro-
ducing a memorandum for the Cabinet in which he emphasized that Brit-
ain had no commitments vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia.52 With the report of the 
Chiefs of Staff to the effect that Britain and its possible allies could not 
provide effective military assistance to Czechoslovakia, the ground was now 
prepared for the Cabinet to sanction Chamberlain’s views. At the Cabinet 
meeting on March 22, Halifax impressed on his colleagues that no policy 
involving a risk of war could be adopted and that the alternative was to 
pressure the Prague government to reach an agreement with the Sudeten 
Germans. To that end, the British would press France to use its influence 
with the Czechs and approach Germany, together with the French, with a 
view to accepting a settlement reached in Czechoslovakia.53 The opposite 
views, including that which warned that the subjugation of the smaller na-
tions in Central and Eastern Europe would immensely increase the re-
sources of Germany two years hence, were brushed aside. Halifax’s pro-
posals, strongly backed by Chamberlain, were accepted and formed the 
basis of British policy in the months to follow. Under Halifax’s instruc-
tions, the Foreign Office also prepared an analysis of what options were 
opened to Britain, which clearly toed Chamberlain’s line. The argument 
that German domination would bring in its tail a danger to the British Em-
pire was declined as being too “confident prediction of future events than 
the experience of history will support.”54 In essence, Whitehall decided to 
leave Czechoslovakia to her fate shortly after the Anschluss.  
The German annexation of Austria had considerable impact on all the 
Danubian countries. From 1935 onwards, Germany had acquired an eco-
nomic stranglehold on export and import trade of these states and that was 
translated into her growing political influence in the region. Danubian 
countries were themselves very much attuned to the attendant dangers to 
their independence and sought help in London. Although the Foreign Of-
fice was sympathetic to their pleas, it could not prevail on the Board of 
Trade and Treasury to depart from laissez-faire economic principles and 
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assist the Danubian states by augmenting their trade with Britain.55 In May 
1938, Halifax took the somewhat sudden initiative to strengthen British 
political influence in Central and South Eastern Europe by using economic 
leverage. For that purpose, he envisaged the formation of an ultimately 
standing Cabinet committee and proposed Vansittart to take charge if it; he 
requested the Foreign Office to work out more detailed suggestions to be 
presented to the Cabinet.56 Shortly afterwards, Halifax submitted a memo-
randum to the Cabinet, stating that as a result of Anschluss German influ-
ence in that region extended “in a manner and to a degree that has not 
been witnessed since 1917.” Halifax argued, in line with traditional British 
policy, that it was essential to prevent Germany from attaining “a virtual 
hegemony in Europe” which would, in case of retrocession of some colo-
nies to Berlin and a probable General Franco’s victory in the Spanish civil 
war, “constitute a direct menace to the security of the British Common-
wealth.” However, the object of the proposed action was not to form an 
anti-German bloc but rather “to endeavor to ensure that this area of 
Europe shall look specifically for leadership to this country, and generally 
towards the Western Powers, rather than feel obliged in default of any 
other point d’appui to allow itself to be exploited by Berlin.”57  
It fell to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy to consider this idea, 
but Chamberlain proved rather obstructive. His unhelpful attitude must 
have had something to do with the decision to appoint Frederick Leith-
Ross, chief economic adviser to the government, to be a chairman of the 
proposed committee rather than Vansittart, whose well-known views and 
vigorous personality would vouch for energetic proceedings. Moreover, 
Chamberlain discounted the political premises on which the whole scheme 
was based and eventually decided that a special ministerial committee was 
not necessary; instead, the inter-departmental committee was established, 
the role of which was confined to examining the material and making rec-
ommendations to the Foreign Policy Committee.58 To further clip the 
wings of the entire scheme, the Foreign Office set itself against collaborat-
ing with the French so as not to foster the impression that it aimed at en-
circling Germany.59 In view of Chamberlain’s efforts to whittle down Hali-
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fax’s original intentions, it was hardly surprising that the two sessions of the 
newly-minted “Interdepartmental Committee on Economic Assistance to 
Central and South-Eastern Europe”―which comprised the representatives 
of the Foreign Office, Bank of England, Board of Trade, Export Credits 
Guarantee Department and Department of Overseas Trade―held in sum-
mer 1938 brought no tangible results. Finally, as Kaiser elaborates in his 
study, the prime minister’s subsequent actions in handling Germany effec-
tively renounced the policy that aimed at containing German economic-
political expansion in the Balkans.60   
Eventually, the Munich conference of September 29–30―the discus-
sion of which is beyond the scope of this study―brought about the dis-
memberment of Czechoslovakia and established an undisputed hegemony 
of the German Reich along the Danube. This was evidenced in the so-
called first Vienna Award on November 2 that saw further mutilation of 
Czechoslovakia to Hungary’s benefit executed through the Axis arbitration. 
Britain and France were content to be excluded from that affair and spared 
additional embarrassment.61 The British government failed, even after the 
Vienna Award, to honor what one of Chamberlain’s ministers described as 
“a moral obligation to [rump] Czechoslovakia” promised at the time of the 
Munich conference.62 The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, however, 
induced the Foreign Office to revive the work of Inter-Departmental 
Committee, although it was admitted that the new conditions might have 
rendered it “Utopian.” Moreover, the guiding principle remained that any 
activities must not have a semblance of the policy of encirclement of Ger-
many. The examination of the situation in individual countries of the re-
gion showed that, apart from Turkey which had been brought under British 
influence by means of a £16-million export credit guarantee, Greece occu-
pied a special position on account of her political and strategic importance 
as Mediterranean, rather than just Balkan, Power. For that reason, the 
passing of Greece into the German camp would be intolerable in terms of 
its “disastrous” effect on Turkey, Egypt and other countries in the Eastern 
Mediterranean; consequently, it was decided that no effort should be 
spared to assist Athens. Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary were 
ranked lower in priority and found to be, to a greater or lesser extent, 
drawn into the German orbit―any assistance to them would be difficult to 
realize. Nevertheless, Halifax recommended different measures with a view 
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to increasing “normal trade” with the countries concerned and extending 
them non-commercial, politically-motivated credits.63 But the emphasis on 
Greece confirmed that Britain had neither strength nor political will for 
determined action in Danubian Europe and thus focused to stem German 
expansion at the gates of the Mediterranean and protect the vitally impor-
tant Imperial communications.       
It was the German occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia on March 
15, 1939, that made apparent the dismal failure of Chamberlain’s ap-
peasement policy. The immediate reaction to German aggression was a 
British guarantee of the independence of Poland, given on March 31, and 
of Romania and Greece on April 13, 1939 (the latter guarantee was also a 
response to Italy’s invasion of Albania on April 7). Given for the purpose of 
deterring Germany from further expansion in Eastern Europe, these guar-
antees were not underwritten with either firm political resolve―a guarantee 
for territorial integrity was conspicuous by absence―or the military capa-
bility to carry them out.64 It was a measure of distrust in British determina-
tion and ability to uphold its guarantee that Yugoslavia found such insur-
ance rather embarrassing and the Foreign Office did not extend it to 
Belgrade. Nevertheless, it was only in the aftermath of these guarantees 
that the British government offered “political credits” to Romania and 
Yugoslavia amounting to five million and 1.5 million pounds respectively 
to be spent, to a large degree, on armaments.65 But this was a case of too 
little, too late to contain the German danger. This became manifest on 
September 1, 1939, when the assault on Poland forced Britain to take up 
arms together with France, although reluctantly and without any effect on 
Poland’s rapid defeat.  
This study demonstrates that until late 1937, Vansittart and his sup-
porters in the Foreign Office, above all Sargent, directed British policy 
towards Danubian Europe in such manner as not to allow Germany to 
believe that Britain would leave unchecked her thrust in that region. This 
was a subtle diplomatic game with a fair element of bluff, but it took ac-
count of the fact that the other side was also bluffing and was not prepared 
for a lengthy war. However, O’Malley rightly pointed out that he was not 
“alone in believing that nothing like a common view” on the recommenda-
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tions made by Vansittart “would be obtainable in this [Foreign] Office, the 
Cabinet, Parliament or the country.”66 There was much force in these 
words at least as far as the Cabinet and parliament were concerned. As has 
been seen, the Foreign Office could not impress its views on the Baldwin 
Cabinet in the summer of 1936, let alone on that of Chamberlain in 1937–
38. It was, however, Chamberlain’s taking control over foreign affairs from 
the Foreign Office specialists that changed the direction of British policy.67 
The prime minister shared the view of many influential Britons that Danu-
bian Europe could not be protected from Germany’s predatory designs 
and, moreover, that British interests did not require an attempt to prevent 
German hegemony in that region. By the time the appeasers disillusioned 
themselves on that score, Germany had grown to that “17 stone” weight 
that Vansittart predicted and warned against. The implications of such 
development came to the light when the Second World War broke out and, 
in particular, in 1940, when Hitler’s armies overran France and wiped out 
British forces from the continent, a major success to which the resources of 
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